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I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper corresponds to a written version of the presentation made at
the Symposium that took place in October 2018 at Florida International
University to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the International Law
Commission (ILC). The theme of the Symposium was “The Role and
Contributions of the International Law Commission to the Development of
International Law in the Past/Next 70 Years: Codification, Progressive
Development, or Both?”
The objective of the panel I had the honor to participate in was to discuss
the ILC’s past practice on progressive development and codification of
International Law, so as to set the scene for the broader discussion on the sort
of “existential” question that faces the ILC at 70 for its future work regarding
topics on its agenda and the fulfillment of the ILC’s mandate regarding the
codification and/or progressive development of International Law.
Having in mind the Statute and the mandate of the ILC, the goal of the
presentation at the Symposium was—rather than to promote an abstract
debate on the notions of progressive development and codification—to
present an empirical brief study of the ILC’s past practice regarding the two
main tasks of its mandate, which are mentioned in Article 13.1.a of the United

*

Member of the International Law Commission. Professor of International Law at the Autonomous
University of Lisbon. The views expressed in the present contribution are in a personal capacity.
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Nations Charter1 and defined in Article 15 of the ILC Statute in the following
manner:
“[P]rogressive development of international law” is used for
convenience as meaning the preparation of draft conventions
on subjects which have not yet been regulated by
international law or in regard to which the law has not yet
been sufficiently developed in the practice of States.
Similarly, the expression “codification of international law”
is used for convenience as meaning the more precise
formulation and systematization of rules of international law
in fields where there already has been extensive State
practice, precedent and doctrine.2
Given the limited time for the presentation, the brief empirical study was
focused on three key areas of International Law that the ILC has worked on,
that also correspond to three major projects accomplished so far by the ILC:
the Law of the Sea (1956); the Law of Treaties (1966); and the Law of State
Responsibility (2001). The empirical study was based essentially in the
analysis of the commentaries adopted by the ILC together with these projects
at the first and/or second reading stages. The usual method of work of the
ILC entails a first reading, which is adopted by the ILC and then sent to
Governments for observations, before a second and final reading that
completes the work of the ILC on a given topic.
Commentaries written on first reading may include minority views
within the ILC, as well as a description of alternative solutions sought, while
commentaries to draft articles adopted on second reading reflect only the
decisions and positions taken by the ILC as a whole. Only the commentaries
were looked at and not doctrinal sources or the case-law of the International
Court of Justice or other international courts and tribunals. Thus, the aim was
to find out if and how the ILC itself characterized its work on the above
mentioned three topics for the purposes of its mandate of progressive
development and codification of International Law. Based on the findings of
such study, some conclusions are drawn at the end.

1 “The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:
promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development
of international law and its codification.” U.N. Charter art. 13, ¶ 1.a.
2 G.A. Res. 174(II), Statute of the International Law Commission, art 15 (Nov. 21, 1947)
(emphasis added) (as amended by subsequent resolutions).
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II. LAW OF THE SEA
One of the initial projects developed by the ILC related to the Law of
the Sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
of 1982, which contains a comprehensive regime on the Law of the Sea that
is currently in force and even considered as a “Constitution” of the Oceans,
was not based on a draft initially prepared by the ILC. However, its
predecessors—the Geneva Conventions of 1958 on different aspects of the
Law of the Sea—were based on drafts initially prepared by the ILC.
The ILC worked intensively on this topic between 1949 and 1956. It
produced a single set of Draft Articles with commentaries on the Law of the
Sea in 1956.3 In 1958, having as basis the Draft Articles prepared by the ILC,
four Geneva Conventions were concluded relating to the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, the High Seas, the Continental Shelf and the Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.
The Draft Articles prepared by the ILC in 1956 contained Draft Article
71 regarding the “Exploration of the Continental Shelf and exploitation of its
natural resources.”4 This Draft Article later became Article 5 of the
Continental Shelf Convention of 1958.5
3 Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its eighth session, in 1956, and submitted
to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (para. 33).
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9, at 1,
U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 253, U.N. Doc
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1 (future pincites will reference the page of the yearbook in which the report is
reprinted) [hereinafter Law of the Sea Draft].
4

Id. at 299:

1. The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources must not result
in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources
of the sea.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 5 of this article, the coastal State is entitled to
construct and maintain on the continental shelf installations necessary for the exploration and
exploitation of its natural resources, establish safety zones at a reasonable distance around such
installations, and take in those zones measures necessary for their protection.
3. Such installations, though under the jurisdiction of the coastal State, do not possess the status of
islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation
of the territorial sea of the coastal State.
4. Due notice must be given of any such installations constructed, and permanent means for giving
warning of their presence must be maintained.
5. Neither the installations themselves, nor the said safety zones around them may be established in
narrow channels or where interference may be caused in recognized sea lanes essential to
international navigation.
5

Continental Shelf Convention art. 5, June 10, 1964, 499 U.N.T.S. 311:
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In Paragraph 1 of the Commentary, the following was stated:
The progressive development of international law, which
takes place against the background of established rules, must
often result in the modification of those rules by reference to
new interests or needs. The extent of that modification must
be determined by the relative importance of the needs and
interests involved. To lay down, therefore, that the
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf must
never result in any interference whatsoever with navigation
and fishing might result in many cases in rendering
somewhat nominal both the sovereign rights of exploration
and exploitation and the very purpose of the articles as
adopted.

1. The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources must not result
in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources
of the sea, nor result in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research
carried out with the intention of open publication.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 6 of this article, the coastal State is entitled to
construct and maintain or operate on the continental shelf installations and other devices necessary
for its exploration and the exploitation of its natural resources, and to establish safety zones around
such installations and devices and to take in those zones measures necessary for their protection.
3. The safety zones referred to in paragraph 2 of this article may extend to a distance of 500 metres
around the installations and other devices which have been erected, measured from each point of
their outer edge. Ships of all nationalities must respect these safety zones.
4. Such installations and devices, though under the jurisdiction of the coastal State, do not possess
the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the
delimitation of the territorial sea of the coastal State.
5. Due notice must be given of the construction of any such installations, and permanent means for
giving warning of their presence must be maintained. Any installations which are abandoned or
disused must be entirely removed.
6. Neither the installations or devices, nor the safety zones around them, may be established where
interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation.
7. The coastal State is obliged to undertake, in the safety zones, all appropriate measures for the
protection of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents.
8. The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of any research concerning the
continental shelf and undertaken there. Nevertheless, the coastal State shall not normally withhold
its consent if the request is submitted by a qualified institution with a view to purely scientific
research into the physical or biological characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the proviso
that the coastal State shall have the right, if it so desires, to participate or to be represented in the
research, and that in any event the results shall be published.
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The case is clearly one of assessment of the relative
importance of the interests involved. Interference, even if
substantial, with navigation and fishing might, in some
cases, be justified. On the other hand, interference even on
an insignificant scale would be unjustified if unrelated to
reasonably conceived requirements of exploration and
exploitation of the continental shelf. While, in the first
instance, the coastal State must be the judge of the
reasonableness—or the justification—of the measures
adopted, in case of dispute the matter must be settled on the
basis of article 73, which governs the settlement of all
disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the
articles.6
This instance is the only meaningful reference in the whole of the
commentaries to substantive issues of progressive development or
codification.
It is interesting to note that the ILC added a new dimension to the
definition of progressive development originally contained in the Statute, by
referring that progressive development must often result in the modification
of established rules by reference to new interests and needs and that the extent
of that modification must be determined by the relative importance of the
needs and interests involved.
III. LAW OF TREATIES
The work on the Law of Treaties has possibly been one of the most
significant contributions of the International Law Commission so far. The
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties of 1966, which work started in 1949,
were the basis for the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties of 1969. In
the Draft Articles adopted in Second Reading with Commentaries,7 there is
no explicit distinction between progressive development and codification in
the text of the commentaries, which contain general references to the task to
“codify the modern law of treaties.”
We would propose to concentrate on two particular Draft Articles,
which contain important features of the current Law of Treaties but that, at
6
7

Law of the Sea Draft, supra note 3, at 299 (emphasis added).

Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its eighteenth session, in 1966, and
submitted to the General Assembly as part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session
(para. 38). The report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in YEARBOOK OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION vol. II 1966. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int.’l L. Comm’n 187, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1966/Add. 1.
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the time of their drafting generated significant discussion. The first one is
Draft Article 50 dealing with jus cogens and later became Article 538 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The second is Draft Article 59
on fundamental change of circumstances that subsequently became Article
629 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Paragraph 1 of the Commentary relating to Draft Article 5010—Treaties
conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus
cogens)—stated the following:
The view that in the last analysis there is no rule of
international law from which States cannot at their own free
will contract out has become increasingly difficult to sustain,
although some jurists deny the existence of any rules of jus
cogens in international law, since in their view even the most
general rules still fall short of being universal. The
Commission pointed out that the law of the Charter
concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself
constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international
law having the character of jus cogens. Moreover, if some
Governments in their comments have expressed doubts as to
8
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M.
679, 698–99 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980):

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
9
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, art. 62:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the
time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as
a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence of those
circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty;
and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed
under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or (b) if the fundamental change
is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any
other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as
a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for
suspending the operation of the treaty.
10
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, supra note 7, art. 50: “A treaty is
void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.”
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the advisability of this article unless it is accompanied by
provision for independent adjudication, only one questioned
the existence of rules of jus cogens in the international law
of today. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that in
codifying the law of treaties it must start from the basis that
today there are certain rules from which States are not
competent to derogate at all by a treaty arrangement, and
which may be changed only by another rule of the same
character.11
Paragraph 3 of the Commentary to Draft Article 50 added the following:
The emergence of rules having the character of jus cogens is
comparatively recent, while international law is in process
of rapid development. The Commission considered the right
course to be to provide in general terms that a treaty is void
if it conflicts with a rule of jus cogens and to leave the full
content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in
the jurisprudence of international tribunals.12
With regard to integrating the concept of peremptory norms of general
international law (jus cogens) in the codification of the Law of Treaties, the
position of the ILC seemed to be thus one of principle rather than based on
the practice of States, which was in rapid development but not fully settled,
at the moment of the elaboration of the Draft Articles, and that the full content
of the rule would be later on worked out in State practice and jurisprudence
of international tribunals.
With regard to Draft Article 5913 on Fundamental Change of
Circumstances, Paragraph 10 of the Commentary stated that:
Certain Governments in their comments emphasized the
dangers which this article may have for the security of
treaties unless it is made subject to some form of
11

See id. at 247.

12

See id. at 248.

13

Id. at 256–57, art. 59:

1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the
time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as
a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) The existence of those
circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty;
and (b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the scope of obligations still to be performed
under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked: (a) As a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from a treaty establishing a boundary; (b) If the fundamental change is the result of a
breach by the party invoking it either of the treaty or of a different international obligation owed to
the other parties to the treaty.
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independent adjudication. Many members of the
Commission also stressed the importance which they
attached to the provision of adequate procedural safeguards
against arbitrary application of the principle of fundamental
change of circumstances as an essential condition of the
acceptability of the article. In general, however, the
Commission did not consider the risks to the security of
treaties involved in the present article to be different in kind
or degree from those involved in the articles dealing with the
various grounds of invalidity or in articles 57, 58 and 61. It
did not think that a principle, valid in itself, could or should
be rejected because of a risk that a State acting in bad faith
might seek to abuse the principle. The proper function of
codification, it believed, was to minimize those risks by
strictly denning and circumscribing the conditions under
which recourse may properly be had to the principle; and this
it has sought to do in the present article. In addition, having
regard to the extreme importance of the stability of treaties
to the security of international relations, it has attached to the
present article, as to all the articles dealing with grounds of
invalidity or termination, the specific procedural safeguards
set out in article 62.14
It is relevant to note that even with regard to more progressive or
innovative solutions again provided by this Draft Article on Fundamental
Change of Circumstances, the ILC emphasized that it was performing an
exercise of codification and that if the provision is a matter of principle, even
subject to a risk of abuse, such concerns could be alleviated by attaching to
such norms adequate procedural safeguards that were also included in the
Draft Articles.
IV. LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The work of the ILC on State Responsibility has also been one of its
most significant contributions. The topic was on the agenda of the
Commission between 1954 and 2001.
Although so far no instrument was concluded under the auspices of the
United Nations on the basis of prior drafts prepared by the ILC and the topic
is still under consideration by the 6th Committee of the UN General

14

Id. at 260.
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Assembly,15 it is worth looking at the Draft Articles with Commentaries
adopted by the ILC upon First Reading in 1996 and on Second Reading in
2001.
Continuing with its past practice, the references in the commentaries to
codification and/or progressive development are not abundant. However, the
ILC does go a bit further than in the cases analyzed above regarding the Law
of the Sea or the Law of Treaties.
In the Draft Articles with Commentaries adopted in First Reading in
1996,16 the ILC referred to the following in Paragraph 12 of the commentary
to Chapter II (The “act of the State” under International Law):
The Commission has thus set itself the task of determining
what conduct international law actually attributes to the
State, basing itself primarily on the findings which result
from an examination of State practice and the decisions of
international tribunals. It is this method by which the
Commission will mainly be guided in drawing up the
provisions of chapter II of this draft. The solutions derived
from practice and judicial decisions will be supplemented,
where necessary, by elements of progressive development.17
And Paragraph 13 of the commentary to Chapter III (Breach of an
international obligation) added that:
Lastly, the Commission wishes to point out that, in preparing
the material which is the subject matter of this new chapter
of the draft, it relies, as in the previous chapters, on the
inductive method followed by the Special Rapporteur in his
reports. Thus State practice and international judicial
decisions are analyzed and, on the basis of that analysis, the
rules to be laid down are formulated. Nevertheless, account
must be taken of the fact that, at least in regard to certain
points, the wealth of precedents is not the same, for example,
as it is for determining criteria for the attribution of an act to
the State. Where necessary, therefore, this lack has to be
made good by giving careful consideration, as a source of
guidance for formulating certain rules, to the true
15 See G.A. Res. 71/133 (Dec. 13, 2016); G.A. Res. 68/104 (Dec. 16, 2013); G.A. Res 65/19 (Dec.
6, 2010); G.A. Res. 62/61 (Dec. 6, 2007); G.A. Res. 59/35 (Dec. 2, 2004); G.A. Res. 56/83 (Dec. 12,
2001).
16 See Draft Articles on State Responsibility With Commentaries Thereto Adopted by the
International
Law
Commission
On
First
Reading
(January
1997),
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_1996.pdf.
17

Id. at 18.
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requirements of the contemporary international community
and to the more authoritative ideas and tendencies which are
emerging. In other words, the progressive development of
international law sometimes has to take precedence over
codification in the strict sense.18
In the introductory comments, thus, in the First Reading, the ILC
recognized that its work on State Responsibility was mostly an exercise of
codification, but where necessary supplemented or even giving way to
progressive development where there is lack of precedent, requirements of
the contemporary international community and tendencies which are
emerging.
Nevertheless, it was still hesitant to openly qualify its work specifically
with regard to the binary of codification and progressive development.
Perhaps the most striking example regards Draft Article 1919 on
“International Crimes and International Delicts” which was undoubtedly one
of the proposals of the First Reading text of 1996 that generated more
discussion, criticism, and even division. Even in this case, in the First
Reading Commentaries, the ILC was not clear about the nature of its work,
having put it in the following terms in Paragraph 73 of the commentary to
Draft Article 19:

18

Id. at 87–88.

19

Id. at 105–06:

1. An act of a State which constitutes a breach of an international obligation is an internationally
wrongful act, regardless of the subject-matter of the obligation breached.
2. An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an international
obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community
that its breach is recognized as a crime in that community as a whole constitutes an international
crime.
3. Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of international law in force, an international
crime may result, inter alia, from: (a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential
importance for the maintenance of international peace and security, such as that prohibiting
aggression; (b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
safeguarding the right of self-determination of peoples, such as that prohibiting the establishment or
maintenance by force of colonial domination; (c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an
international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those
prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid; (d) a serious breach of an international obligation of
essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as those
prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.
4. Any internationally wrongful act which is not an international crime in accordance with paragraph
2 constitutes an international delict.
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In conclusion, the Commission wishes to emphasize that it
is aware of the exceptional importance of the subject dealt
with in this article. In the codification of the law of
international responsibility, the adoption of a formulation
which expressly recognizes the distinction between
international crimes and international delicts is a step
comparable to that achieved by the explicit recognition of
the category of rules of jus cogens in the codification of the
law of treaties. The Commission is therefore convinced that
the representatives of Governments will devote very special
attention to this article when discussing its report.20
Thus, the option of the ILC was to compare Draft Article 19 on International
Crimes and Delicts to Jus Cogens and to draw the attention of State to the
exceptional importance of this draft article.
As it is well known, Draft Article 19 on International Crimes and Delicts
did not make it to the Second Reading text, due to the strong opposition of
Member States in the UN Sixth Committee, which led to a change in
approach in the Commission in the Second Reading. In the text of the Draft
Articles with Commentaries adopted on Second Reading in 2001,21 the
Commission considered the distinction between crimes and delicts should be
abandoned:
Accordingly, the present articles do not recognize the
existence of any distinction between State “crimes” and
“delicts” for the purposes of Part One. On the other hand, it
is necessary for the articles to reflect that there are certain
consequences flowing from the basic concepts of
peremptory norms of general international law and
obligations to the international community as a whole within
the field of State responsibility.22
In the context of considering which would be the consequences flowing
from jus cogens and erga omnes norms, the ILC took a step further in
qualifying more explicitly its work, namely with regard to Articles 41 and 48
as progressive development, though in a general exercise of codification and

20

Id. at 132.

21

Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.A/56/10 (2001). Text
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the
General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/56/10). The
report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in the Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, as corrected.
22 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries
[2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 111.
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progressive development on the law on State Responsibility, as it is stated in
Paragraph 1 of the General Commentary:
These articles seek to formulate, by way of codification and
progressive development, the basic rules of international law
concerning the responsibility of States for their
internationally wrongful acts. The emphasis is on the
secondary rules of State responsibility: that is to say, the
general conditions under international law for the State to be
considered responsible for wrongful actions or omissions,
and the legal consequences which flow therefrom. The
articles do not attempt to define the content of the
international obligations, the breach of which gives rise to
responsibility. This is the function of the primary rules,
whose codification would involve restating most of
substantive customary and conventional international law.23
More specifically, with regard to Draft Article 41,24 regarding
“Particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under this
chapter,” in Paragraph 3 of the Commentary, it is emphasized that:
Neither does paragraph 1 prescribe what measures States
should take in order to bring to an end serious breaches in
the sense of article 40. Such cooperation must be through
lawful means, the choice of which will depend on the
circumstances of the given situation. It is, however, made
clear that the obligation to cooperate applies to States
whether or not they are individually affected by the serious
breach. What is called for in the face of serious breaches is a
joint and coordinated effort by all States to counteract the
effects of these breaches. It may be open to question whether
general international law at present prescribes a positive duty
of cooperation, and paragraph 1 in that respect may reflect
the progressive development of international law. But in fact

23

Id. at 31, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).

24

Id. at 113–14, art. 41. Draft Article 41:

1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the
meaning of article 40.
2. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of
article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.
3. This article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this part and to such
further consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under international law.
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such cooperation, especially in the framework of
international organizations, is carried out already in response
to the gravest breaches of international law and it is often the
only way of providing an effective remedy. Paragraph 1
seeks to strengthen existing mechanisms of cooperation, on
the basis that all States are called upon to make an
appropriate response to the serious breaches referred to in
article 40.25
So with regard to Draft Article 41/1, the Commentary refers that it
“may” reflect the progressive development of international law, but without
taking a definitive position and allowing the law to further develop in this
direction. Concerning Draft Article 4826 on the subject of “Invocation of
responsibility by a State other than an injured State,” Paragraph 12 of the
Commentary clarified that:
Under paragraph 2 (a), any State referred to in article 48 is
entitled to request cessation of the wrongful act and, if the
circumstances require, assurances and guarantees of nonrepetition under article 30. In addition, paragraph 2 (b)
allows such a State to claim from the responsible State
reparation in accordance with the provisions of chapter II of
Part Two. In case of breaches of obligations under article 48,
it may well be that there is no State which is individually
injured by the breach, yet it is highly desirable that some
State or States be in a position to claim reparation, in
particular restitution. In accordance with paragraph 2 (b),
such a claim must be made in the interest of the injured State,
if any, or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. This
aspect of article 48, paragraph 2, involves a measure of
25

Id. at 114, ¶ 3.

26

Id. at 126 art. 48. Draft Article 48:

1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State in
accordance with paragraph 2 if: (a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including
that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) the
obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole.
2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1 may claim from the responsible
State: (a) cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of nonrepetition in accordance with article 30; and (b) performance of the obligation of reparation in
accordance with the preceding articles, in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of
the obligation breached.
3. The requirements for the invocation of responsibility by an injured State under articles 43, 44 and
45 apply to an invocation of responsibility by a State entitled to do so under paragraph 1.
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progressive development, which is justified since it provides
a means of protecting the community or collective interest at
stake. In this context it may be noted that certain provisions,
for example in various human rights treaties, allow
invocation of responsibility by any State party.27
And Paragraph 14 of the Commentary added that:
Secondly, paragraph 3 allows for such further consequences
of a serious breach as may be provided for by international
law. This may be done by the individual primary rule, as in
the case of the prohibition of aggression. Paragraph 3
accordingly allows that international law may recognize
additional legal consequences flowing from the commission
of a serious breach in the sense of article 40. The fact that
such further consequences are not expressly referred to in
chapter III does not prejudice their recognition in presentday international law, or their further development. In
addition, paragraph 3 reflects the conviction that the legal
regime of serious breaches is itself in a state of development.
By setting out certain basic legal consequences of serious
breaches in the sense of article 40, article 41 does not intend
to preclude the future development of a more elaborate
regime of consequences entailed by such breaches.28
With regard to Articles 48/2 and 48/3, the ILC was careful in stating
that, in the first case, the article involves a measure of progressive
development and, in the latter case, that the current text that contains basic
legal consequences does not intend to preclude the future development of a
more elaborate regime.
V.

CONCLUSION

The brief empirical analysis undertaken with regard to three major
projects of the ILC regarding the Law of the Sea, Law of Treaties, and Law
of State Responsibility illustrates the fact that the ILC has not qualified its
own work as progressive development or codification on a systematic and
thorough basis.
In the three key projects analyzed, in fact, it only seldom did it. When it
did so, it did it in a careful, cautious, and wise manner, not only because in
27
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, at 127, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 127, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1.
28

Id. at 116.
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practice the distinction between codification and progressive development is
hard to perform in a rigorous way, but also because the ILC seemed to be
conscious of the possibility of the continuing development of international
law and to the catalyst effect its work may have on that development, given
that the Draft Articles it produces may generate treaty rules that reflect
customary international law.
Compared with other topics that have also been on the agenda of the
ILC, only on very few occasions has the ILC decided it was appropriate to
make a clear statement with regard to the status of progressive development
of a certain project or of particular provisions. For instance, with regard to
the topic “Responsibility of International Organizations,” the Draft Articles
with commentaries adopted in 201129 clearly refer in Paragraph 5 of the
General Commentary that:
The fact that several of the present draft articles are based on
limited practice moves the border between codification and
progressive development in the direction of the latter. It may
occur that a provision in the articles on State responsibility
could be regarded as representing codification, while the
corresponding provision on the responsibility of
international organizations is more in the nature of
progressive development. In other words, the provisions of
the present draft articles do not necessarily yet have the same
authority as the corresponding provisions on State
responsibility.30
This is probably one of the single occasions where the ILC clarified that the
whole of the Draft Articles was rather in the nature of progressive
development and thus did not have the same authority of those concerning
State Responsibility.

29
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/66/10
(2011), reprinted in [2011] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 46–47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1.
Adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and submitted to the
General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/66/10). The
report, which also contains commentaries to the draft articles (para. 88), appears in Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two.
30

Id.
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On the topic of “Diplomatic protection”, in the Draft Articles adopted
in 2006,31 Paragraph 1 of the Commentary to Draft Article 1932 entitled
“Recommended Practice” stressed that:
There are certain practices on the part of States in the field
of diplomatic protection which have not yet acquired the
status of customary rules and which are not susceptible to
transformation into rules of law in the exercise of
progressive development of the law. Nevertheless they are
desirable practices, constituting necessary features of
diplomatic protection, that add strength to diplomatic
protection as a means for the protection of human rights and
foreign investment. These practices are recommended to
States for their consideration in the exercise of diplomatic
protection in draft article 19, which recommends that States
“should” follow certain practices.33
In this last case, the ILC has added a new possible dimension to its work
that is neither codification nor progressive development, but recommended
or desirable practices that States should follow when exercising the
diplomatic protection on behalf of their nationals.
In conclusion, this brief analysis has shown that the ILC has exercised
in the past its mandate of progressive development and codification in a wise,
discrete and restrained manner. The ILC has privileged the adoption of good
legal solutions that will sustain the test of time and respond to the interests of
the international community. In this regard, it has sought to avoid the risk of
freezing the development of international law by over-classifying its work as
one or the other track of its inseparable and interlinked mandate of
progressive development and codification.

31 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/61/10
(2006), reprinted in [2006] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1. Text
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-eighth session, in 2006, and submitted to the
General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/61/10). The
report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two.
32

Draft Article 19:

A State entitled to exercise diplomatic protection according to the present draft articles, should: (a)
give due consideration to the possibility of exercising diplomatic protection, especially when a
significant injury has occurred; (b) take into account, wherever feasible, the views of injured persons
with regard to resort to diplomatic protection and the reparation to be sought; and (c) transfer to the
injured person any compensation obtained for the injury from the responsible State subject to any
reasonable deductions.
33 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/61/10
(2006), reprinted in [2006] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1.

